
The Genesis of the Special Relationship Between the United States and Israel, 1948–1973

Bat-Ami Zucker

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a special relationship has developed between the United States, one of the largest and most powerful nations, and Israel, one of the smallest Middle Eastern countries. Its most obvious and profound expression has been America's continuing support for Israel's existence and safety. Despite occasional discord and contrasting trends among American policymakers, especially those who consider support for Israel to be a burden on American Middle Eastern policy, the fundamental sympathy and support for Israel has not diminished. Israel is perceived and discussed in favorable terms, and support for Israel enjoys wide appeal, bipartisan consensus, and acknowledgment by presidents and the Congress. The long-standing U.S.-Israeli relationship is unusual even among friendly nations. The fact that it has endured despite the absence of any formal arrangement, even at times when strategic logic dictated against strong support for Israel, suggests that strategic motives alone cannot fully explain the relationship between the two countries.

Various studies, both pro- and anti-Israel, offer explanations of America's decisions with regard to Israel that focus mainly on domestic political considerations.¹ This study will attempt to illustrate the unique pattern of the American-Israeli relationship as a bond that combines a range of factors, but is dominated and backed by sincere public sympathy and sentiment. Both domestic and international politics no doubt contribute their share, yet it is the widespread and established concern for Israel that developed in the United States after World War II that is the cornerstone for American support.

The Origin of America's Pro-Israel Policy

Our study focuses on the period from the establishment of Israel in 1948 to the Yom Kippur War in 1973. It is our belief that the special

relationship between the two countries was formed and established then, when Israel's enemies were continuously threatening to destroy the state. This is not to say that U.S.-Israel relations have undergone major changes since 1973, though a different pattern has indeed developed now that peace initiatives have become the dominant element in U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Rather, it reflects the fact that America's relationship with Israel between 1948 and 1973 differed significantly not only from its relationships with other friendly countries during the same period but also from its relations with Israel since 1973.

What is of particular interest to us is an analysis of how and why U.S. policy toward Israel—only one of the small states in the Middle East with which the United States maintains friendly relations—has taken a completely different form from that followed elsewhere. Although research shows that American attitudes to Israel are dominated by a sense of moral obligation, which in itself is somewhat unusual even among friendly nations, moral obligations have also been a factor in U.S. relations with other countries, albeit to a lesser degree. Only in the case of Israel, however, has a moral commitment to the safety of another country been articulated by every single American president since 1949. Furthermore, the notion that the American commitment to Israel is outside the realm of political debate has not only been reiterated by every administration, but has also been manifested in the bipartisan record as well as in the media.² In an exclusive interview published in *U.S. News and World Report*, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger described the U.S. commitment to Israel in these terms: "We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every administration."³

Prior to that, at a 1967 meeting in Glassboro, New Jersey, when Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin asked President Lyndon Johnson why Americans supported Israel against the Arab world, the latter simply replied: "Because we think it's right"—an argument rarely used in diplomatic circles.⁴ A June 1967 *Washington Post* editorial expressed the same idea when it stated that "Israel's moral claims upon the Western world . . . make it unthinkable for this country, or its allies, to permit the Jewish state to be destroyed."⁵

The humanitarian aspect of America's support for Israel is often referred to in administration statements. In discussing the bond between the United States and Israel, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush told a Senate appropriations subcommittee on November 5, 1973 that "there is a strong humanitarian interest . . . and in a very strong and nonpartisan way this country considers itself a friend of Israel, who will help Israel in time of trouble and at other times."⁶ And the unique nature of the commitment has been stressed as well; for example, by Under-Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, who said: "The United States has supported the security and well-being of Israel . . . with a constancy rarely surpassed in the history of relations between nations."⁷

Cold War Considerations

The uniqueness of America's relationship with Israel has drawn much attention.⁸ Even though their relationship has not been formalized, the two countries are bound together by a bond that in practice has been as strong as any alliance, written or unwritten.⁹ Fascinated by the tie between Israel and the United States, especially in view of the immense disparity "in size, power, and international role between the two countries,"¹⁰ many scholars have sought to examine its motivations.

In the 1950s, some argued that it was the policy of containment,¹¹ adopted shortly before Israel's establishment, that led to America's friendly and supportive attitude, stressing that Israel, as a stable democracy, fit nicely into the American plan to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East.¹² However, this view fails to take into consideration the cruel fact that a state with a Jewish population of less than 2.5 million (at that time) could hardly be counted upon as a strategic asset in the face of the many large Arab states that criticized any and all American assistance to Israel as a menace to their own well-being. Moreover, in a period when courting the Arab countries was deemed necessary to bring them into the Western defense system, and when Europe was still totally dependent on these countries for its oil, it would seemingly have made more strategic sense to let Israel stand on its own.¹³ Indeed, this is precisely what State Department specialists recommended, considering Israel a burden to the United States and an obstacle to friendly relations with the Arab countries.¹⁴

In view of the preceding analysis, one must conclude that there was, and still is, more behind the American-Israeli special relationship than strategic motives. Even Senator J. William Fulbright, a leading figure in pro-Arab circles, concluded in August 1970 that "America [was] tied to Israel less by strategic consideration than by bonds of culture and sentiment."¹⁵ Yet there is no doubt that anti-Soviet objectives also played a role in the identification of American interests with Israel's, especially during the Johnson administration. The tendency of the United States to refrain from associating the Arab countries with the Western defense zone was already evident in the late 1950s. Keeping to the old objective of retaining America's position, U.S. policy, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was to protect America's interests against Soviet expansion by cultivating friendly countries—Arab states as well as Israel—on an individual basis.¹⁶ It was in this context, especially after the Six-Day War in June 1967, that Israel, politically stable, militarily powerful, and friendly, was deemed a valued asset in stabilizing the balance of power in the region. As Senator Henry Jackson said in 1971, "The Israelis are today in the front-line in resisting the historic imperial ambitions that lie behind Soviet policy. . . . They deserve our support because they are allied with the security interests of the United States in a vital region of the world."¹⁷

To sum up, it was not containment as such, but the broader global objectives of American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, that facilitated U.S. support for Israel.¹⁸ For, despite differences in tactics and occasional discord, support for Israel continued to be a central element of American Middle East policy and "a matter of concern for all Americans."¹⁹

The fact that the U.S. commitment to Israel continued even when strategic logic dictated against it leads us to conclude that the relationship between the two countries could be explained, as Senator Jackson put it, by "shared values, cultural affinities and a common ethical and religious heritage."²⁰

Israel as a Sister Democracy

First among the factors that contributed to widespread American sympathy and goodwill toward the State of Israel during the period

from 1948 to 1973 are the common beliefs shared by the people of both countries. Israel's commitment to maintaining a democratic form of government—unique in the Middle East—guaranteed American support from the outset. In 1950, the *Washington Post* called Israel "an example of genuine democracy."²¹ And in 1960, the *New York Times* described it as "an outpost of democratic government and haven for the oppressed."²²

The *Congressional Record* of the late 1960s is replete with citations representing Israel as "the democratic oasis in a desert of dictators" and as a "solid bastion of freedom and democracy against the forces of aggression and totalitarianism."²³

More than any other new nation born in this century, Israel has proved the indomitable strength of democracy. The miracle of Israel lies not alone in the flourishing democracy it has created in the Holy Land, but in its unique success in spreading the idea and practice of democracy . . . to other lands, to emerging nations of Africa and Asia.²⁴

In the decades following the establishment of Israel, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* competed in praising the new state as "the showplace of democracy" which had accomplished the impossible,²⁵ the *Times* even using phraseology similar to that in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address to express why America so closely identified with Israel, which was "conceived in idealism and born in fire."²⁶ A positive reaction to the small and distant state seemed to come naturally to the American public, since "the concepts of social justice and democracy upon which [Israel] was founded are among [America's] most cherished ancient traditions."²⁷

Admiration for a Nation of Pioneers

Similarities in the origins and history of the two countries further stimulated American understanding, sympathy, and nostalgia.²⁸ Much like the United States, "Israel is a nation of different peoples . . . endeavoring to build a new and just society."²⁹ Its pioneering spirit was often compared with that of the American pioneers, thereby evoking reminiscences of America's glorious past.³⁰ For Americans, dedicated to the idea of achievement and progress, Israel's accom-

plishments were seen as "little short of a miracle";³¹ "If ever a desert has been made to blossom like the rose, modern Israel it is."³² Moreover, Israel's economic success was seen as an example of what could be attained "through determination, hard work and application of modern technology."³³ Finally, the Israelis themselves were admired as young, gallant, and courageous, and were praised for their industriousness, determination, and sacrifice—an outcome of the "unconquerable strength of a pioneer spirit welling up from two thousand years of tragic history."³⁴

Christian Sympathy for Israel

Reinforcing the effect of a common democratic heritage and pioneering background were America's religious and historical ties to the Old Testament, which facilitated the development of a natural kinship with the land of the Bible and people of the book. The link between the ancient Hebrews and the modern Israelis was played up repeatedly. Although many Americans were reluctant to identify the cause of religion with that of a state,³⁵ and it has always been difficult to establish anything like a consensus concerning Israel among America's Christians,³⁶ the absence of a united position on Israel does not mean that Americans do not have strong feelings regarding the security of the Jewish state.³⁷ Furthermore, for many, Israel's very existence is a proof for the realization of biblical prophecies. The vision of Israel as the land where the biblical happenings took place stimulates the American imagination. "The Bible stories," President Johnson reminisced at a B'nai B'rith meeting in 1968, "are woven into my childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution."³⁸ Once the link between the Bible, the Holy Land, and Israel was established, "a profound bond" was erected between "the Jews of Israel and the Christians of America,"³⁹ the latter seeing "the hand of the Lord in the creation of Israel and . . . in bringing the Jews back to Israel."⁴⁰

A poll in June 1967, when Israel was engaged in a war to prevent its extinction, indicated that support for Israel stemmed, among other reasons, from "sympathy for the 'little guy' fighting the 'big guy'."⁴¹ Involved here was not only the traditional American concern for the

underdog,⁴² but the American attachment to the Bible as a source of moral and social justice. In this respect, the Puritan heritage, which identified the Old Testament with supreme good, can be said to have had an impact on American attitudes toward Israel.⁴³

American Jews and Israel

If believing American Christians were emotionally affected by the vision of Israel as the land where biblical promises were fulfilled, this vision promoted a much deeper bond between American Jews and the new Jewish state. It should, however, be stressed at the outset that the American Jewish attitude toward Israel—affectionate and consistently supportive as it has been—arose, for the most part, from the wellsprings of the Jewish experience in America. In this sense, it reflects an attitude similar to that of Christian Americans. Thus, although most American Jews do not seek to disassociate themselves from their Jewish identity,⁴⁴ they primarily visualize themselves as Americans and act accordingly. Therefore, American Jewry's moral, political, and financial support for Israel reflects general American beliefs as well as an identification with Judaism and solidarity with the Jewish people. To most American Jews, this identification is "visceral, profound, overwhelming beyond fighting."⁴⁵ As Melvin Urofsky puts it, "American Jews have proved that they are also very much Americans, and their predominate value system is an amalgam of Jewish teachings and American democratic norms."⁴⁶ When administrations have considered adopting a less sympathetic attitude toward Israel, therefore, American Jews have opposed such changes "as Americans, as men and women dedicated to freedom, to democracy and humanity."⁴⁷ In sum, whether for religious or traditional cultural reasons, American Jews have given Israel and its well-being increasing attention since 1948.⁴⁸

No doubt it is the sense of belonging to one family, of sharing a heritage of faith, history, and fate, that has determined the American Jewish attitude toward Israel. Although American Jewry is a highly complex community composed of diverse groups and viewpoints, and its members often differ in regard to Israel, the American Jewish community has nevertheless evinced strong attachment to the Jewish

state and acknowledged its sovereignty by helping to provide for Israel's financial as well as political needs.⁴⁹

The fact that the American Jewish community was, and still is, "unified and motivated to work in Israel's behalf"⁵⁰ reflects Israel's having become "the crucial operative element in shaping organized Jewish life."⁵¹ In this regard, American Jewry views relations between itself and Israel as similar to that of "partners . . . [in] a real marriage between two highly strong individuals facing an unfriendly world together."⁵² To follow the same image, American Jews indeed represent a strong partner in a marriage. After having succeeding in establishing their status as Americans in American society, they can now identify with Israel overtly without being accused of parochialism.⁵³ Their ability to profess their deep connection with and concern for Israel points to the democratic nature of American society as well as to their acceptance and acculturation. This has been manifested time and time again, for example, in the actions of the many Jewish members of Congress who have been willing and able to demonstrate their commitment to the survival and safety of the Jewish state by forming an "in-house lobby" for Israel,⁵⁴ taking leadership roles in resolutions supporting Israel and providing it with additional aid.⁵⁵

Analyzing the American Jewish community after World War II, Jacob Neusner explains that "after four generations [in the United States], to be Jewish is a mode of being American, taken for granted by Jews among other Americans, and no longer problematical."⁵⁶ With their position in America established, Jews now felt safe and secure enough, in both their Jewishness and their Americanism, "to challenge major aspects of the United States' foreign policy, with regard both to the Middle East and Soviet Union."⁵⁷ Thus, when Richard Nixon and George McGovern tried to make aid to Israel a political issue during the 1972 presidential campaign, the eight top national Jewish organizations banded together to deplore such appeals to American Jews, stressing that "Jews vote as individual Americans . . . according to their individual judgments," and have "a deep interest in the broad range of domestic and foreign policies involved in the present campaign."⁵⁸ An editorial in the *New York Times* confirmed the authenticity of this statement: "All studies indicate that the Middle East problem is only one of many entering into

the voting decisions of Jewish Americans now and in the past."⁵⁹ Even fiery Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who was well known for feeling that all Jews belonged in Israel, acknowledged that American Jews "have only one political attachment and that is to the United States of America."⁶⁰

Nevertheless, given America's freedom and democratic political system, the Jewish community could openly express its loyalty to the State of Israel, "the national home of the entire Jewish people,"⁶¹ whenever it deemed such expression necessary to Israel's security. Indeed it is the successful interrelation between Jewish and American beliefs that has allowed American Jews the unique position of being fully dedicated to and identified with America and its interests, both domestic and foreign, and at the same time to acknowledge their Jewishness by supporting Israel.⁶² To those who cast doubt on the Americanism of Jews who support Israel, implying that this means a watered-down loyalty to the United States or a possible clash between their American and their Jewish interests,⁶³ it must be pointed out that two sets of values operate on the American Jewish scene, one dealing with inner substance and the other with civic identification. Whereas in their support for Israel American Jews express their inner being and Jewish identity, which neither is nor should be defined in terms of civic loyalty, their attitude toward the United States has always evinced their political and social fidelity as citizens of that country. Indeed, it is the harmony between Jewishness and devotion to what America stands for that has motivated American Jews to involve themselves in American political life far beyond their proportion of the U.S. population. In other words, it is their feeling that in the United States they can participate on equal terms that gives them the sense of security to combine their civic loyalty with an overt declaration of their faith.

The Pro-Israel Lobby

The pro-Israel lobby in Washington reflects both aspects of American Jewish life. As Hyman H. Bookbinder once put it: "What's good for American society is terribly important to the Jewish community."⁶⁴ Similarly, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a

Washington lobby representing "the totality of Jewish influence in America,"⁶⁵ functions to aid Israeli interests within the broad parameters of the American political system, "on the basis of American interests."⁶⁶ Indeed, almost all responsible American Jewish activists who engage in the support of Israel repeatedly underline that they are acting as Americans.

In this regard, AIPAC has always stressed that it is an American, not a Jewish lobby.⁶⁷ I. N. Kenen, who founded the American Zionist Council, which became AIPAC in 1954, was convinced from the start that in order to succeed, the organization would have to be "an American outfit, run by Americans with taxable—not tax-free—dollars."⁶⁸ Thus, while AIPAC engages in activities aimed at influencing presidents and members of Congress to provide for the safety of Israel, its goals have always included the creation of a bridge between the Jewish communities of Israel and the United States and the promotion of friendly relations between the two countries.⁶⁹ Furthermore, despite its obvious concern for Israel, AIPAC does not follow the Israeli line, as its director, Morris Amitay, stressed in 1975 when he stated that his organization did not maintain any formal ties with the Israeli embassy.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, as a one-issue organization committed to the safety of Israel, AIPAC has pressed for the same things as the Israeli government.⁷¹

Given the fact that American Jews constitute an important interest group,⁷² it was likely from the start that an energetic pro-Israel lobby would have a good chance of making itself heard and listened to. While Jews made up only about 3 percent of the general American population and 4 percent of the voting population during the period we are considering, their concentration in specific regions, their education, wealth, and unusually broad involvement in politics, and their strong feelings for Israel made the Jewish vote an important consideration for many policy-makers, as it still is.⁷³ The centrality of the State of Israel in the American Jewish mind, together with the importance of the Jewish vote in American politics, has facilitated the active participation of the Jewish community in pressing for pro-Israel legislation, thereby adding yet another dimension to the special relationship between the United States and the State of Israel.

Although the Israel lobby has been credited with extraordinary successes and has acquired a reputation as a "highly organized and well-endowed association" that is "the most powerful, best-run, and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington,"⁷⁴ critics of the strong U.S. commitment to Israel have taken a less positive view of the lobby's influence.⁷⁵ Thus, Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a long-time foe of the United States-Israel alliance, proclaimed that the lobby "can count on 75 to 80 votes on anything . . . [in which it is] interested in the Senate."⁷⁶ More balanced appraisals describe the lobby as "neither insidious nor so overwhelmingly powerful."⁷⁷

Although the exact role and the degree of success of the Israel lobby have always been disputed, there does seem to be agreement that whatever strength it has lies in its being in accord with the generally positive American attitude toward Israel.⁷⁸

Israel and the Holocaust

Support for Israel between 1948 and 1973 was widespread in Congress, government, and the general populace, all of whom favored Israel's "existence, integrity and security." The positive American attitude toward Israel, together with the historical, cultural, and democratic similarities between the two countries, facilitated pro-Israel activities by non-Jewish Americans and enabled American Jews to achieve peace of mind and soul regarding their fellow Jews outside the United States. Moreover, the creation of the Jewish state led to increased identity with their own Jewishness. In addition to the crucial role Israel played in shaping and strengthening the self-identity of American Jews, its activity represented a total contrast to the horrors of the Holocaust, for "Israel stood, symbolically, as the redemption of the Holocaust; Israel made it possible to endure the memory of Auschwitz."⁷⁹

This aspect of Israel's establishment led to two diametrically opposed attitudes toward the Jewish state. For some, Israel's democratic sovereignty and independence were a triumphant negation of the Holocaust, or as survivor and author Elie Weisel put it: "Behind the army of Israel stood another army of six million ghosts."⁸⁰ On the

other hand, and perhaps integrally connected with the first, was the view—especially on the eve of the Six-Day War and during the Yom Kippur War—that focused on Israel's possible destruction and the consequent fatal blow to both Jewishness and Jewish status in the United States.⁸¹

Among proponents of this latter view, "there was a widespread feeling that the lives of all Jews, that the fate of Judaism itself, hung in the balance. If Israel perished then Jews everywhere would perish . . . because their faith could not survive a second onslaught."⁸² Among those who held this view was Senator Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on the Middle East during the Six-Day War. Born in Germany into a family that managed to escape in 1933, Boschwitz has always been aware of his responsibility as a Jew and as someone who could have been a victim of the Holocaust. This, he acknowledged, "has given me more of that so-called Holocaust mentality than most people would otherwise have had. . . . I have a great sense of the dangers facing Jews and Israel."⁸³

As indicated above, these two attitudes combined to underscore the moral commitment to the security of Israel as a guarantee against a second Holocaust. For, "were Israel to be destroyed, then Hitler would be alive again, the final victory would be his."⁸⁴ This feeling is not limited to Jewish circles. The United States government has always emphasized its role in the establishment of Israel, and has sometimes expressed its responsibility and moral commitment to the Jewish survivors of the Nazi slaughter of six million Jews.⁸⁵ In the words of Adlai Stevenson in 1956, "Israel is the symbol . . . of man's triumph over one of the darkest sorrows in human history—the attempt of Adolf Hitler to destroy a whole people."⁸⁶

Conclusions

To sum up, it is the combination of American ideals and the aspirations of American Jews that has been largely responsible for the willingness of the U.S. government to respond to and cooperate with American Jewry. This parity of ideals and common interests has made possible an American policy toward Israel that generally reflects support of American Jewish concerns when Israel's enemies

have continuously threatened to destroy the state. No less important in this regard is the fact that initiating, launching, or supporting Jewish and/or Israeli goals has often proved politically rewarding.⁸⁷

Although some government officials and members of Congress have criticized the pressure put on the United States by interest groups in general and by the Israel lobby in particular, the majority of the American public believes in the justice and validity of Israel's cause. As Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland has concluded: ". . . even if there were no Israel lobby, the American people would remain solidly committed to Israel's survival."⁸⁸

Although the pro-Israel stance in Congress and in successive presidential administrations has no doubt come about because support for Israel combined the pursuit of U.S. national interests in the Middle East with electoral profit in the form of Jewish political support, it has been the sympathy, appreciation, admiration, and identification of the American public at large with Israel's democratic and moral values—with its heritage and long-overdue homeland—that is really behind the special and unprecedented relationship between the two countries.

This study derives from my long-standing interest in the American-Israeli special relationship, particularly during the period from 1948 to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. It is of historical interest because it sheds light on the events themselves and, even more, because it enables us to better understand the continuity of the unique relationship between Israel and the United States after 1973. Before the Yom Kippur War this relationship flourished under constant Arab threats to destroy Israel; since then the political atmosphere in the Middle East has changed. Relations between the two countries are now dominated by a different set of priorities in which American peace initiatives have more than once conflicted with Israel's political orientation. However, the bond established during 1948–1973 has held despite the more open American criticism of Israel and the occasional tension between Washington and Jerusalem.

Bat-Ami Zucker is Professor of History at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. She has published scholarly articles in Israeli and American journals and is the author of *U.S. Aid to Israel and Its Reflection in the New York Times and the Washington Post, 1948–1973: The Pen, the Sword, and the Middle East* (1991).

Notes

1. See, for example, Bernard Reich, *The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Edward B. Glick, *The Triangular Connection: America, Israel and American Jews* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

2. With regard to the media, our examination focused on two representatives of the elite press, the *New York Times* (hereafter NYT) and the *Washington Post* (hereafter WP). They were singled out because they are considered the most prestigious and influential papers in the United States; so much so, in fact, that successive administrations have been sensitive to the views presented on their editorial pages. For the media's attitude, see, for example, NYT editorials, February 26, 1956, September 10, 1968, and September 2, 1969; WP editorial, "Israeli Shift," October 19, 1950.

3. *U.S. News and World Report*, June 23, 1975, p. 23.

4. Cited in Glick, *Triangular Connection*, p. 106.

5. Editorial "The Lessons of History," WP, June 6, 1968.

6. Cited in "Evolution of United States Role in the Middle East," *Congressional Quarterly*, "The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs" (April 1974), p. 8.

7. An address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science on April 11, 1969; *Department of State Release*, no. 78, p. 2.

8. See, for example, Robert F. Drinan, *Honor the Promise: America's Commitment to Israel* (New York: Doubleday, 1977). Even a pro-Arab analysis argues that "such a moral commitment to another state is unique in the annals of international relations and foreign policy"; Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, p. 10.

9. James Lee Ray, *The Future of American-Israeli Relations: A Parting of the Ways?* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 1.

10. Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 332-333.

11. The term "containment" was popularized by Soviet affairs expert George Kennan, who served as minister-counselor in Moscow in 1944 and returned as ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in 1952. See George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (New York: Pantheon, 1967), pp. 361-367.

12. See, for example, the May 3, 1959 news release by Congressman Emanuel Celler (Celler Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Subject File 504, "Israel—General, 1959-1960"): "Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. The Administration must know that it can rely upon Israel and its army as its major bulwark in the Middle East."

13. See, for example, editorial, WP, February 21, 1956; John P. Roche, "Europe Fears U.S. Role in Israel Poses War Peril Involving NATO," WP, June 17, 1970.

14. See also C. L. Sulzberger, "The Roots of Hell," NYT, June 9, 1967: "Pragmatic American interests were clearly with the Arabs, who possessed vast petroleum deposits in which U.S. firms had invested fortunes."

15. Cited in J. Kraft, "The Prophet Fulbright," WP, August 23, 1970.

16. Such an orientation was possible due to a change in the strategic global situation when the growing use of ballistic missiles reduced the necessity of foreign bases and the U.S. began seeking relations based on more substantial interests.

17. *Congressional Record* (hereafter CR), September 3, 1971, p. H-14867. See also Senator Henry Jackson's report in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *The Middle East and American Security*, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., December 1970; statement by Senator Jackson, CR, March

23, 1971, pp. 53518–53519; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "An Offensive View of Israel's Relations with U.S.," *WP*, April 9, 1971.

18. In an address to the National Executive Council of the American Jewish Committee on October 28, 1973, Eugene V. Rostow argued that "the United States is supporting Israel in order to protect vital national interests of the U.S. and of its allies and friends in Europe, the Middle East and Asia." Typescript, p. 1. For a different opinion, see former Assistant Secretary of State Parker T. Hart, "The Go-Between: A Role that the U.S. Can No Longer Play," *New Middle East*, November 1972, pp. 7–10.

19. Senator Robert F. Kennedy's statement on the eve of the 1967 war, in Thomas Ronan, "Kennedy Urges Steps for Peace," *NYT*, June 4, 1967.

20. Senator Jackson's report to the Committee on Armed Services.

21. Editorial, "Israeli Shift," *WP*, October 19, 1950.

22. Editorial, "Ben-Gurion in Washington," *NYT*, March 10, 1960.

23. Congressman Pucinsky, *CR*, April 23, 1969, p. 10139; Congressman Minish, *CR*, May 15, 1968, p. 13538; Senator Clark, *ibid.*, p. 11541; Senator Griffin, *CR*, May 2, 1968, p. 11541.

24. *CR*, May 2, 1968, p. 11541. See also a joint statement issued by several senators, *NYT*, October 22, 1950.

25. Editorial, "Israel at the Poles," *WP*, August 1, 1951.

26. Editorial, "Israel's Tenth," *NYT*, April 24, 1958.

27. Congressman Rodino, *CR*, May 11, 1970, p. 15001.

28. Senator Kefauver, *CR*, Senate, April 24, 1958, p. 14.

29. Congressman Wolff, *CR*, May 2, 1968, p. 11424.

30. See, for example, E. Morton Cutler, "The Founding of Two Nations: Israel and the United States," *Georgia Review* 8 (Summer 1954): 1–4; Abba Eban, "U.S. and Israel: Common Traditions," *American Zionist* 5 (September 1953): 8–12. See also *NYT*, May 14, 1950.

31. Congressman Morgan, *CR*, May 2, 1968, p. 11422; Congressman Farbstein, *ibid.*, p. 11423.

32. John Chamberlain, "What Israel Has Done for the West," *WP*, June 5, 1957.

33. Editorial "Israel's President," *WP*, August 2, 1966.

34. Editorial "Israel's Tenth," *NYT*, April 24, 1958.

35. John B. Orr, "Theological Perspectives on Arab-Israeli Conflict," in *The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy*, ed. Willard Berling (Albany: SUNY Press, 1973), p. 345.

36. The traditional organs of Christian political comment, *Christianity and Crisis*, *Christian Century*, *Christianity Today*, *Commonwealth Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, reflect the absence of a unified Christian approach. See, for example, Roger L. Shinn, "The Tragic Middle East," *Christianity and Crisis*, 29, no. 15 (September 15, 1969): 233–236.

37. Drinan, *Honor the Promise*, pp. 235–236.

38. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 16 September 1968, p. 1343.

39. Drinan, *Honor the Promise*, p. 3.

40. Alan R. Balboni, "A Study of the Efforts of American Zionists to Influence the Formation and Conduct of United States Foreign Policy during the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower Administrations" (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1973), p. 66. See also Congressman Friedel, *CR*, April 23, 1969, p. 10139.

41. *WP*, June 12, 1967.

42. Senator Pearson's Statement, *CR*, November 5, 1971, p. 39583.

43. C. L. Sulzberger, "The Roots of Hell," *NYT*, June 9, 1963: "There is [a] somewhat mystical bond that stems from Puritan ideas and Bible fundamentalism and which existed long before Zionism."

44. Eugene Borowitz describes the unique and free behavior of American Jews with regard to Israel as follows: "Instead of trying to hide their Jewishness, American Jews were now proud . . . about their identity." See Eugene B. Borowitz, *A New Jewish Theology in the Making* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1968), p. 19. See also D. Elazar, "Building Jewish Citizenship in the Emerging Jewish Community," *Forum* 23 (Spring 1975): 8.

45. Roger Kahn, *The Passionate People: What It Means to Be a Jew in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1968), p. 52.

46. Melvin I. Urofsky, *We Are One: American Jewry and Israel* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1978), p. 375.

47. Senator Herbert H. Lehman's statement before American Jewish leaders, *NYT*, March 8, 1953.

48. See, for example, Norman Podhoretz, "Now, Instant Zionism," *NYT Magazine*, February 3, 1974, p. 11; Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and American Jewry," *Commentary* 44 (August 1967): 72: "The sense of belonging to a worldwide Jewish people of which Israel is the center . . . seems to persist even among Jews who regard themselves as secularists or atheists."

49. Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 369; Glick, *Triangular Connection*, p. 126.

50. Bernard Reich, *The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 193.

51. Daniel Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976), p. 79.

52. Glick, *Triangular Connection*, p. 126.

53. Amy Stone and David Szonyi, "Jews in Congress," *Moment*, May-June 1976, pp. 31-32; Urofsky, *We Are One*, p. 72.

54. David M. Szonyi, "What Does Your Congressman Know About the Middle-East?" *Interchange* 1 (February 1976): 1, 6.

55. Stone and Szonyi, "Jews in Congress," pp. 31-32.

56. Jacob Neusner, *American Judaism, Adventure in Modernity: An Anthological Essay* (New York: Ktav, 1978), pp. 3, 88; see also Congressman Farbstein's statement in *CR*, May 2, 1968, p. 11423.

57. Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 241-245; Wolf Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 133: "American Jews have risen in the political and economic structure of the country, they have begun to feel more comfortable with lobby openly."

58. Irving Speigel, "Campaigning on Israel Deplored by Jews," *NYT*, September 2, 1972.

59. Editorial, "Israel and the Election," *NYT*, September 2, 1972.

60. Cited in Peter Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p. 305.

61. Bert Lockyer, chairman of the Zionist Executive, cited in W. T. Mallison, Jr., "The Legal Problems Concerning the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization Jewish Agency: A Study in International and United States Law," *William and Mary Law Review*, Spring 1968, p. 563.

62. Reich, *U.S. and Israel*, p. 195. See also Orr, "Theological Perspectives," p. 345: "Israel is the answer to European Jewry's need for a haven for everyday life, but it is also an answer to Americans . . . for a haven from the secular embrace of everyday life. That is to say, what is secular nationalism in Israel is piety in America."

63. Merrill Simun, *Middle East at the Brink* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Security, 1982), p. 58; Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem*, p. 135.

64. Judy Gardner, "Israel Lobby: A Strong but Nebulous Force," *Congressional Quarterly* 33 (April 30, 1975): 1872. Bookbinder, assistant director of the Office of Economic Opportunity between 1964 and 1967, was also a special assistant to Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey.

65. Bookbinder's definition of the Jewish lobby in Gardner, "Israel Lobby," p. 1873. Although there are several other national and umbrella Jewish organizations in the United States, notably the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, that join together with AIPAC to form the major coordinating bodies in the lobbying efforts for Israel, AIPAC is the only officially registered domestic lobbying organization established for the purpose of influencing legislation regarding Israel and its security. Reich, *U.S. and Israel*, p. 199.

66. Statement by Morris J. Amitay, director of AIPAC, cited in Gardner, "Israel Lobby," p. 1872.

67. William J. Lanouthe, "The Many Faces of the Jewish Lobby in America," *National Journal* 19 (May 13, 1978): 748.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 750.

69. Gardner, "Israel Lobby," p. 1872.

70. Interview in *Congressional Quarterly* 33 (August 30, 1975).

71. Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem*, p. 147.

72. The term "interest group" has been defined as "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance . . . of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes," in David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 33.

73. Reich, *Quest for Peace*, pp. 367-370.

74. Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 41; David P. Calleo, "American Domestic Priorities and the Demands of Alliance," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Spring 1983): 6, 7.

75. "Israeli Lobby: Calling in the Congressional Votes," in *The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs Congressional Quarterly*, April 1974, p. 54.

76. Cited in "The Israel Lobby: Instant Votes When Needed," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 31 (October 27, 1973): 2858. See also Seth P. Tillman, "United States Middle East Policy: Theory and Practice," *American-Arab Affairs* 4 (Spring 1983): 9-10.

77. Ray, *Future of American-Israeli Relations*, p. 32; see also Glick, *Triangular Connection*, p. 103: "It is at best an oversimplification and at worst an untrue to claim or believe that American Jews control or determine what the American government wants and does in the Middle East."

78. Reich, *Quest for Peace*, p. 372.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 374, 433-434. Gardner, "Israel Lobby," pp. 1873-1874; Hyman Bookbinder, "Ethnic Pressure and the Jewish Lobby: Myths and Facts," *Washington Letter*, September 1975, pp. 1-8. See also the Harris Survey articles that appeared in the *WP* on June 11, July 10, and October 9, 1967; July 24, 1968; March 19, 1970, November 11 and December 23, 1973.

80. Urofsky, *We Are One*, p. 351.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 359.

82. Podhoretz, "Now, Instant Zionism," p. 42: "The feeling was and is—that if Israel were to be annihilated, the Jews of America would also disappear."

83. Urofsky, *We Are One*, p. 351.

84. Cited in Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem*, p. 118.

85. Urofsky, *We Are One*, p. 351. See also Glick, *Triangular Connection*, p. 126: "Both Israel and the Jews of America carry . . . a shared fear of [the] repetition [of the Holocaust], and a shared

determination that they must do everything in their combined power to prevent its ever happening again."

86. *NYT*, October 24, 1956.

87. See, for example, J. Alsop, "Democrats and Jews," *WP*, June 9, 1971.

88. Charles McC. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (Summer 1981): 997.